OSS + ELC EU 2026

Zephyr RTOS is increasingly relevant for safety-related and
mixed-criticality systems, where qualification and certification must
address standards such as IEC 61508 and ISO 26262. A key question is
how to provide evidence that software components are independent, that
freedom from interference is preserved, and that future changes can be
assessed without redoing unnecessary qualification work.

This session presents ongoing work on reverse engineering Zephyr's
effective software architectural constraints using static
analysis. Starting from concrete Zephyr configurations, we model
components, observe calls and data accesses, identify dependencies,
and compare the result with the project's intended layered
architecture.

The talk will show how this analysis supports safety arguments by
making software-level independence explicit and checkable. It will
also show how the same model enables Change Impact Analysis: when a
qualified Zephyr version or configuration evolves, the model helps
determine which components, assumptions, tests, and safety evidence
are affected. This is essential to make Zephyr's safety effort
sustainable over time and viable for safety-related development.